DOES RELIGIOUS BELIEF REQUIRE RATIONAL JUSTIFICATION?

DOES RELIGIOUS BELIEF REQUIRE RATIONAL JUSTIFICATION?

KayJATTA

INTRODUCTION:

Religious belief that lays claim to truth must require a rational argument for its justification. Rational arguments for justifying religious belief utilize objective scientific reasoning. In contrast, some religious beliefs or decisions may be dependent on personal nature and emotions rather than reasoning. In such cases, religious beliefs are not grounded in scientific objectivity or the intellect. Just like music, religious belief can be appreciated intellectually or emotional (personal nature).
This paper attempts to examine religious belief from a rational argumentative point of view. I will argue that one’s religious belief in God requires a rational argument for its
 justification. Lack of a rational prove of one’s religious belief defeats any purpose for such belief, in my view.

MAIN ARGUMENTS:

“It is wrong to belief in anything that is based on insufficient evidence”, said Alvin Plantinga. This argument appears inconsistent with revealed theology. Revealed theology as contained in the scriptures largely provides no rational justifications for what it claims. Since most religious beliefs are based on these scriptures, then religious belief invariably becomes a question of faith rather than rational proves.  Therefore, revealed theology about one’s belief that is not based on rational arguments is not justifiable.
 This position is also supported by classical foundationalism and evidentialism.  Classical foundationalism argues that a belief is justifiable if it is self evident, evident to the senses, and incorrigible. That is to say that a belief is justified if it is based on a basic belief.
Evidentialism on the other hand states that a belief is justified only if there is evidence to support it. Perhaps natural theology based on reasoning attempts to fill this evidential
 void in beliefs based on revealed theology. Therefore, St. Anselm's ontological argument and St. Aquina's teleological and cosmological arguments are not adequate
 justifications. David Hume, Liebniz, and John Leslie Mackie all dispute the compatibility of evil with the existence of an all-powerful and benevolent God. 
Therefore, St. Aquinas’ argument that the existence of God is self-evident because it exists naturally in us is not supported by evidentialism. Aquinas’ argument is a derivative of St. Anselm’s ontological argument which states that “something is self-evident if it is understood as soon as the terms are known”. It is important to note however that  Aquina's arguments are largely reactions to or re-positioning of an earlier Greek philosopher, Aristotle's postulations.
William James’ contention that “wherever there is willingness to
 act, there is some believing tendency” also touches on this ontological argument. James admits that “our passional and volitional nature (that is our nonintellectual nature) lay at the root of all our convictions and beliefs”. But Clifford perhaps countered that “belief is desecrated when given to unproved and unquestioned statements for the solace and private pleasure of the believer …”. Huxley may have said it more bluntly when he stood for “…not pretending to belief what one has no reason to belief”. Huxley's contention therefore refutes Alvin Plantinga's argument that "belief in God is a basic belief that requires no further justification".

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to justifying one’s religious belief is the “problems of evil and omnipotence”. The problem of God being all-knowing and all-merciful  and yet
 allowing so much evil in the world, presents a huge difficulty in rational justification of His existence. The presence of so much evil in the world appears to indicate a restriction on His powers. Is this the best He can do? Several scholars have approach this problem in different ways, however. There is a suggestion that "evil is a counterpart to good". That is to say that God could
 not have created good without creating evil alongside it. This argument itself limits Gods powers and undermines the attribute of omnipotence assigned to Him. Another
 argument to counter this contradiction in the existence and nature of God and once religious belief is that "evil is necessary as a means to good". This argument means that evil is not a counterpart of good, but rather a pathway to good. This idea  again conflicts with idea of an omnipotent God. It is also argued in Mackie (pg. 102) that the presence of evil is not about God at all, but rather human free will. Since God has enabled human beings with freewill, the presence of evil is a question of human choice between good and bad. Evil basically, according to this argument is a necessary consequence of freedom. These adequate and fallacious solutions to the problem of evil are far inadequate because they all place restrictions on God's omnipotence. We are still presented with the paradox of omnipotence. "Can an omnipotent God create things which he cannot subsequently control? Or Can an omnipotent God make rules which then bind him?", (Mackie, pg. 104). Therefore, according to John Leslie Mackie, unqualified omnipotence cannot be ascribed to anything that continues to exist through time and space. This appears to imply that the nature of existence itself contradicts the idea of omnipotence. 
 The question of the existence of an omnipotent God is very problematic, at least philosophically. And since one's religious belief invariably centers on this idea of omnipotent God, no one therefore can rationally justify his or her religious belief. Rational justification is however  necessary for any religious belief. Therefore Blaise Pascal's probabilistic argument in favor of the lack of rational prove for religious belief is both unethical and intellectually dishonest. This position is rejected by Clifford as already indicated above.
 
CONCLUSION:

In this paper, I have attempted to argue that one's religious belief  do require a rational arguments for its justification. I have presented a review of the literature concerning the
 philosophy of religion and developed my argument largely from there. I have examined the early theories about religious belief and its premises, particularly the
 existence of an all-powerful and all-knowing merciful God from St. Anselm, St. Aquinas ,and impliedly Descartes . I have also visited the British empiricist  David Hume; John Mackie; the rationalist philosopher, Liebniz; as well as Alvin Plantinga; and William James.
I have argued that the ontological, teleological, and cosmological arguments presented are far inadequate justifications for one's religious belief. I have also presented various
 argument for an against the" problem of evil" and the "problem  of omnipotence. I have disputed Pascal ,Plantinga ,and James's arguments for a rationally unjustified religious  belief. I have argued that rational argument for one's religious belief is absolutely necessary to justify such a belief to rational beings such as human beings. I have rejected Hume's Philo and instead somewhat embraced Cleanthes' humanistic view of the universe. I have largely agreed with Mackie's rejection of an unqualified omnipotent God.